The former US second-in-command Dick Cheney, who passed away at the age of 84, was considered arguably the most influential occupants of that office in American history. Although many second-in-commands had to settle for marginal or symbolic positions, Cheney exercised huge influence during the administration of George W Bush, to the point that he was frequently referred to as the "true president".
Bush disliked such a characterisation and claimed the relationship was more complicated. He noted that Cheney was respectful, invariably addressing him in official appearances as Mr President, while he addressed him as Dick. Bush disputed even descriptions of their partnership as a collaboration because it implied that they were equals. Regardless of these objections, Cheney considered the easygoing president malleable on a whole raft of governmental choices.
Leading of a faction of neo-conservatives that featured defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld and deputy defence secretary Paul Wolfowitz, he pushed hard for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 in reaction to the terrorist strikes on New York and Washington. At the time of the 9/11 strike, Bush had been taking part in a meeting at a elementary school in Florida. As Bush headed for a secret bunker in Nebraska, Cheney assumed control, ordering the destruction of any non-communicating airplanes nearing the Capitol building.
Cheney said the attacks altered his perspective, making him become determined on retribution. Together with other neo-cons, like Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz, he lobbied for a invasion of Afghanistan in an effort to capture Osama bin Laden. Cheney then strongly advocated for the invasion of Iraq, although there was no evidence of Saddam Hussein being involved.
He expressed no regrets about the armed intervention, in which an approximated 100,000 Iraqis died, nor about the harsh treatment of individuals rounded up after 9/11. He told CNN in 2015 that the Iraq military action, which was predicated on misleading information circulated by Cheney, was the correct course of action. "It represented the right thing to do at that time. I had faith back then and I hold that view presently."
Yet even at the time, there were contrary opinions at a top tier about the poor management of Iraq. One of the government's own representatives to the region, General Anthony Zinni (2001-03), was not reappointed from the position. "I witnessed, as a baseline," he wrote later "clear negligence, negligence, and recklessness: in the worst case, falsehoods, ineptitude, and dishonesty."
Cheney was not completely accountable for the Iraq military action. Before 9/11, Wolfowitz had advocated for similar measures. He had composed a memo detailing situations in which national priorities might be endangered (encompassing "availability of vital raw materials, primarily Persian Gulf oil"). Wolfowitz had asserted that "America should be postured to take unilateral action when collective action prove impossible," particularly mentioning defense operations against Iraq.
Bush too had assumed the Oval Office vaguely intent on executing what his parent had famously refused to do in 1991; topple Saddam. Subsequent to he had been fired by the White House, the finance chief Paul O'Neill disclosed how, at the opening session of the National Security Council in January 2001, Bush had stated his objective of diminishing America's involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and suggested defense operations against Iraq.
Bush bore a individual resentment against Saddam, convinced he had been behind a plot to kill his parent, President George HW Bush, on a trip to Kuwait in 1993. He furthermore resented that one of the largest hotels in Baghdad had a ground design with a likeness of his father's countenance that all visitors had to walk over.
Yet it was Cheney who was among the most vociferous behind striking Iraq, consistently referencing agency briefings that were whether thin or entirely deceptive. He endorsed what the Bush government indirectly described as "enhanced interrogation", the application of waterboarding and physical pressure.
Responding to a Senate report in 2014 that found that no actionable intelligence had come from the harsh techniques, Cheney rejected the conclusions as "riddled with crap". He informed Fox News: "We requested [the CIA] to take steps and put in place procedures to catch the bastards who killed 3,000 of us on 9/11 and ensure it was not repeated. That was specifically what they did and they merit a lot of credit."
Cheney reveled in labels imposed on him by critics such as Darth Vader and the dark figure, and by the concept that he was a shadow power directing Bush. In Peter Baker's 2013 book about the two, Days of Fire: Bush and Cheney in the White House, Cheney is cited as commenting: "Is it me who is the sinister strategist in the corner that remains unseen come out of his lair? This represents a advantageous way to work, in fact."
Controversy over his business interests accompanied him throughout his time as VP. Even though he had minimal expertise in corporate affairs but established relationships in defence, especially in Saudi Arabia, he was offered a position at Halliburton, one of the world's most substantial oil and gas conglomerates, in 1995 as leader and top executive.
In 2000 he assumed the role of Bush's election partner for the White House. Controversially, during the military campaign, Halliburton was granted US agreements valued at multiple billions.
It greatly increased his wealth. His annual income during his time at the company grew from his $258,394 when he was Pentagon chief to millions. When he resigned in 2000 he had a compensation package worth in excess of $20m|twenty